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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover money for purchases 
made with credit cards issued by Respondent to Appellants. 
Appellants allege that their rights under the Federal 
Truth in Lending Act have been violated. The two cases 
involve nearly identical facts and the same "Cardholder 
Agreement". 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court granted Respondent summary judgment 
against each Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the District Court's 
judgments or modification of the judgments to limit 
Appellants' liability for unauthorized use to $50.00 each. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Appellant Harlan 
In July, 1979, Appellant Harlan, who was prior 
to that time a VISA cardholder at Respondent bank, 
requested that John Harlan be added to the account as an 
authorized user. Respondent honored this request and 
issued Mr. Harlan a VISA card. (Harlan R. 32, 35) On or 
about October 11, 1979, Appellant Harlan wrote Respondent 
stating that as of that date, she would no longer be 
-2-
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responsible for charges made by John Harlan, thus making 
any further charges on the account by him unauthorized. 
Appellant Harlan cancelled her account by the same letter. 
(Harlan R. 33, 36). Appellant Harlan's husband continued 
to make charges on the account, which were unpaid, 
resulting in this lawsuit by Respondent. 
B. Appellant Jones 
Appellant Jones and Respondent have entered into 
a Stipulation regarding the facts of her case, found at 
Jones R. 74-80. The facts are essentially similar to those 
of Appellant Harlan. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NOTICE TO THE BANK ENDED 
AUTHOR! ZED USE BY APPELLANTS' 
HUSBAND.S; AFTER SUCH NOTICE 
APPELLANTS' LIABILITY IS 
LIMITED BY TRUTH IN LENDING 
LAW 
The essential issue in this case is whether the 
use of the credit cards by Appellants' husbands after 
notice to the bank was unauthorized use. If the use was 
unauthorized, then both Appellants are protected by the 
provisions of the Truth in Lending Act which limit 
liability for unauthorized use to $50.00. 
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Regulation 
-3-
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z, 12 CFR §226 define and distinguish a "cardholder" from 
a card user and explain unauthorized use. A cardholder is 
defined as 
any person to whom a credit 
card is issued or any person 
who has agreed with the card 
issuer to pay obligations 
arising from the issuance of a 
credit card to another person. 
15 u.s.c. §1602(m), 
while unauthorized use 
me.ans a use of a credit card 
by a person other than the 
cardholder who does not have 
actual, implied-, or. apparent 
authority for such ~se and 
from which the cardholder 
receives no benefit. 15 
u.s.c. §1602 (o). 
TILA and Regulation Z are designed to assist 
consumers. The Act,"is to be liberally construed in favor 
of the consumer. Its terms are to be strictly enforced." 
Martin v. American Express, Inc., 361 So.2d 597, 600(Ala. 
Civ. App. 1978). Given the facts of the present cases it 
is clear that Appellants are the only cardholders and thus 
entitled to the statutory limitation on liability. In 
addition, common law agency principles compel the same 
conclusion. 
While there are no reported cases on point on 
the issue of cardholder versus authorized user in the 
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husband-wife context, this Court can and should rely on 
interpretations of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation 
z issued by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) , the 
administrative agency issuing the regulations and 
responsible for the~r enforcement, to clarify the meaning 
of "cardholder." The U.S. Supreme Court has held that FRB 
comments are entitled to great deference. "This 
traditional acquiescence in administrative expertise is 
~ particularly apt under TILA, because the Federal Reserve 
Board has played a pivotal role in 'setting [the 
statutory] machinery in motion.'" Ford Motor Co. v. 
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 at 565 (1980). 
Appellants Harlan and Jones both requested that 
Respondent issue credit _cards to their husbands and were 
thus the only persons who agreed to pay the obligations 
arising from use of the card. In neither case did 
Respondent have any co~tact · with the husbands. , In the 
case of Appellant Harlan, an ac6ount had been established 
in her name for several years prior to -her application for 
a card for her husband as an authorized user. In fact, 
Respondent's own form required Appellant Harlan, as 
"primary cardholder" to be fully liable for charges made 
by the newly authorized user on her account. See Harlan 
-5-
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R. 10, 35. In the case of Appellant Jones, an account was 
established solely at the request of Mrs. Jones, 
authorizing use by Mr. Jones only through her, even though 
denominated a joint account. Respondent took the position 
below, and the trial court apparently agreed, that Mr. 
· Jones was a cardholder, since his use of the card after 
the notice of November 11,· 1977 was certainly not with 
implied, actual or apparent autho~ity nor for the benefit 
of Appellant Jones. This analysis is incorrect. 
First, Walker Bank has apparently recognized 
that only Betty Jones and Gloria Harlan are contractually 
liable on these actions, ~. e. are the only 11 cardholders",""" 
by the very nature of these lawsuits naming only 
Appellants. If Respondent claimed that Richard Jones or 
John Harlan were 11 cardholders" and thus their use could 
not ·be unauthorized, they would obviously have been 
jointly liable, indispensable co-defendants. Respondent 
clearly concluded, to the contrary when this action was 
filed. 
Second, 15 U.S.C. §1642 and 12 C.F.R. §226.13(a) 
provide that no credit card shall be issued to any person 
except in response to a request or application therefor or 
as a renewal of or subs ti tu ti.on for an already accepted 
-b-
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card. This provision was interpreted by the Federal 
Reserve Board in light of ~ facts similar to those of 
Appellant Jones in FRB Official Staff Interpretation, No. 
FC-0070, May 11, 1977, 42 Fed.Reg. 25,491 {1977) (Jones R. 
136A). The FRB held that credit cards sent in response to 
a request from one spouse will be proper {i.e. not 
unsolicited), "provided that only the requesting spouse is 
the cardholder ... regardless of the name {s) in which the 
cards are issued .... [T] his practice is consistent with 
the requirements of §2-26. 13 of Regulation Z and U.S. C. 
§§1642, and 1643 all of which contemplate that card issuers 
may issue cards· to authorized users (who are not 
contractually liable on the account) at the behest of a 
cardholder." Therefore, since Mr. Jones neither requested 
a credit card from Respondent, nor gave authorization to 
Mrs. Jones ·to act as his agent to do so, Mr. Jones cannot 
be a cardholder and can only be an "authorized user" on 
his wife's account. Any construction which resulted in 
Mr. Jones being a cardholder without having requested a 
card or entering into an agreement would mean a violation 
of 15 U.S.C. §1642, prohibiting the issuance of 
unsolicited credit cards, and would absolve Appellant 
Jones of any liability for charges made by Mr. Jones at 
-7-
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any time, or at least entitling her to a set-off against 
money owed. This analysis leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that the two cases herein are identical in that 
the husbands are no more than authorized users whose 
-
authority to use the cards ~as terminated by notice to the 
bank from the cardholder, their wives. 
By requesting credit cards for their husbands, 
Appellants bestowed upon their husbands the status of 
"authorized user" of the credit account. With no express 
procedures for revoking such authorization, Defendants 
each notified Plaintiff that they no longer had any 
control over the charges made by their husbands and that 
these charges were, from the dates of notification, 
"unauthorized." 15 U.S.C. §1643 sets out the criteria for 
cardholder liability for the unauthorized use of the 
credit card: 
(a) A cardholder shall be 
liable for the unauthorized 
use of a credit card only if 
the card is an accepted credit 
card, the liability is not in 
excess of $50.00 ... and the 
unauthorized use occurs before 
the cardholder has notified 
the issuer that an 
unauthorized use of the credit 
card has occurred or may occur 
as the result of loss, theft, 
or otherwise. 
-8 
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... For the purposes of this 
section, a cardholder notifies 
the issuer by taking such 
steps as may be reasonably 
required in the ordinary 
course of business to provide 
the card issuer with the 
pertinent information. 
(d) Except as provided in 
this section, a cardholder 
incurs no liability from the 
unauthorized use of a credit 
card. 
See also 12 C.F.R. §226.13(b) and (e). Both Appellants 
notified the Respondent in writing of the unauthorized 
use. (Jones R. 75, 79, 80, Harlan R. 33, 37). Nowhere in 
the statute or in the regulations is surrender of any 
existing credit cards necessary to _ limit liability. Nor 
is such surrender a requisite to limited liability as 
provided for in Paragraph 8 of the cardholder agreement. 
Return of the credit cards is required to terminate the 
account and the credit agreement with Respondent under 
paragraph 10 of the agreement, but not to limit liability 
for unauthorized use. Appellants thus took all reasonably 
required steps to notify Respondent of the unauthorized 
use. 
The remaining issue is when the Appellants' 
liability for their husbands' charges ended - when the 
bank was notified or when Appellants' own cards were 
-9-
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finally returned. Respondent takes the position that only 
return of the cards terminates liability, relying on the 
provision of Paragraph 10 of the agreement, but this 
agreement must fall before the higher authority of federal 
statute and regulations when there is a conflict. 
This issue was addressed in a recent case before 
the Federal Trade Commission which is -the only reported 
case on the subject. There, the Commission found an oil 
company in violation of 12 C.F.R. §226.13(b) for failing 
to limit the liability of a cardholder where the 
cardholder had notified the creditor that authorized use 
of the credit card had been revoked. The oil company had 
refused to limit liability until the card had been 
returned to the issuer. In the Matter of Shell Oil 
Company, 95 F.T.C. 357 (1980). (Jone·s R. 136B). The FTC 
is granted authority similar to that of the FRB regarding 
credit cards and TILA violations, but is limited to 
merchant credit, including oil companies, while the FRB 
regulates banks. This decision should also be afforded 
great deference. 
The continued use of the credit card by 
Appellant Jones has no impact upon the statutory limit of 
her liability for unauthorized use of the card. She had 
no desire to terminate the charge account, nor did she 
-10=-s 
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wish to terminate liability for the authorized charges 
which she placed upon the account. Nowhere in the 
statute, regulations, 
stated that limited 
contingent upon the 
Respondent certainly 
or the cardholder agreement is 
liability for unauthorized use 
it 
is 
cardholder terminating 
could have terminated 
the account. 
account at will in accordance with paragraph 
agreement, but a~parently chose not to do so. 
Appellants' 
10 of the 
Appellant Harlan's responsibility was the same. 
It is disputed whether or not her card was destroyed in an 
AM/PM Teller machine, but her liability does not hinge on 
this fact. She was liable for the charges made by her 
husband because she had made him an authorized user. It 
was upon her authority that he used her account and it was 
within her control to revoke his "authorized user" status. 
Again, nowhere is it stated that to do this ·she must 
terminate her account. Given this apparent · conflict 
between the cardholder Agreement and federal law and 
regulations, the law and regulations must prevail. 
Three other courts have considered similar but 
not identical situations regarding unauthorized use. In 
Martin, supra, a cardholder was found liable for debts 
incurred by a business· partner when the partner was given 
the use of, and misused, the Defendants' credit card. 
-11-
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There, the Defendant notified the bank only after the 
partner's unauthorized use of the card and relied only 
upon an earlier instruction to the bank that no more than 
$1,000 was to be charged to his account. The court found 
him liable, stating that its · holding was an attempt to 
avoid collusion where the "unscrupulous and dishonest 
cardholder" would "defraud the card issuer." It is clear 
that these are not such cases. Both Appellants Jones and 
Harlan notified the bank before the unauthorized use 
began. Respondent at that time had more control over the 
use of the cards than did either Appellant. Respondent 
could have cancelled the accounts and had the cards 
confiscated . by a merchant in Portland (in the case of 
Jones) or in Denver (in the case of Harlan) , much more 
easily than could the Appellants. In Socony Mobil Oil Co. 
v. Greif, 197 N.Y. 2d 522 (N.Y. App. 1960), the court felt 
this extra control by the creditor was a major factor when 
the cardholder had reported the unauthorized use of a 
credit card held by his estranged wife. The court held 
the cardholder husband not liable for his wife's charges 
after notification to the oil company. A similar result 
is found in Cleveland Trust Co. v. Snyder, 380 N.E.2d 354 
(Ohio App. 1978). 
15 u.s.c. §1643 declares limited iiability is 
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warranted where the unauthorized use may occur as a result 
of "loss, theft, or otherwise". The unauthorized use of 
Appellants' credit cards, although not resulting from loss 
or theft, did result from a wrongdoing similar to that 
found in Socony Mobil Oil, supra. Where the language is 
clear in the Truth in Lending Act and in the implementing 
regulations, as well as in Plaintiff's own cardholder 
agreement, the act must be strictly enforced. No 
additional terms can be imposed contrary to the interests 
of the consumer. 
Finally, Respondent has utterly failed to meet 
its burden of proof in showing that use was authorized or 
that if the use was unauthorized the conditions of 
liability of 15 U.S.C. §1643(a) have been met. In neither 
Appellant Harlan or Appellant Jones' case has the required 
showing been made. Without -this showing, Respondent is 
not entitled to judgment / the District Court's summary 
judgment findin9s are inappropriate and should be 
reversed. This is particularly true regarding Appellant 
Harlan where Respondent's own affidavit (Harlan R. 33) is 
inconsistent as to the date when usage became 
unauthorized. 
CONCLUSION 
Since notice to Respondent bank ended the 
-13-
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authorized use of Appellants' credit cards by their 
husbands, their liability for charges after the notice is 
limited to $50.00 by federal law ·and regulations. Any 
contrary language or implication of the cardholder 
agreement is superceded by statute. The summary judgments 
of the District Court should be_ reversed. 
DATED this ~j 
' 
day of F~ , 1982. 
-14-
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
By-~~~ ~ &-,,__~ 
BRUCE PLENK 
By 
RON 
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